Samuel Taggart (he/him/his)

CONTACT INFORMATION

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APPOINTMENTS

Assistant Professor, Oberlin College, August 2017 - June 2023
Associate Professor, Oberlin College, July 2023 - Present
Courses:
Introduction to Computer Science (CSCI 150): Fall 2021, Fall 2024
Introduction to Computer Science Lab Instructor (CSCI 150): Fall 2017, Spring 2018, Fall 2018, Spring 2019, Fall 2021, Spring 2022, Fall 2022, Fall 2024
Data Structures Lab Instructor (CSCI 151): Fall 2022
Algorithms (CSCI 280): Fall 2017, Fall 2018, Fall 2019, Spring 2020, Spring 2023
Advanced Algorithms (CSCI 365): Spring 2018, Fall 2019, Spring 2022
Theory of Computation (CSCI 383): Spring 2019, Spring 2020, Fall 2022, Spring 2023, Fall 2024, Spring 2025
Economics and Computation (CSCI 385): Fall 2018, Spring 2025

Visiting Instructor, Northeastern University, Fall 2014
Courses: Algorithms (EECS 5800)

EDUCATION

Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois

Ph.D., Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, August 2017

- Advisor: Jason Hartline
- Area of Study: Theory of Computer Science

Oberlin College and Conservatory, Oberlin, Ohio

B.A., Mathematics, May 2012

B.M., Violin Performance, May 2012

WORKING PAPERS

R. Patel, M. Pountourakis, S. Taggart, Repeated Sales with Heterogeneous Buyer Sophistication

J. Hartline, D. Hoy, S. Taggart, Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria

PUBLICATIONS

All author orders are alphabetical.

R. Patel, E. Pountourakis, S. Taggart, Repeated Sales with Heterogeneous Buyer Sophistication *The 21st Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE)*, New Brunswick, New Jersey, December 2025

R. Bowers, M. Garbea, E. Pountourakis, S. Taggart, Polynomial-Time Approximation Schemes via Utility Alignment: Unit-Demand Pricing and More *2025 IEEE 66th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS)*, Sydney, Australia, December 2025

A. Khodabakhsh, E. Pountourakis, S. Taggart, Simple Delegated Choice *2024 Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA)*, Alexandria, Virginia, January 2024

R. Abebe, A. Eck, C. Ikeokwu[1], and S. Taggart, An Algorithmic Introduction to Savings Circles, *36th Annual AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, Virtual, February 2022

J. Abernethy, R. Cummings, B. Kumar, J. Morgenstern, and S. Taggart, Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive Guarantees, *32nd International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS)*, Vancouver, Canada, December 2019

J. Hartline, S. Taggart, Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms, *20th Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, Phoenix, AZ, July 2019

D. Hoy, S. Taggart, Z. Wang, A Tighter Welfare Guarantee for First-Price Auctions, *50th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC)*, Los Angeles, CA, July 2018

N. Immorlica, B. Lucier, E. Pountourakis, S. Taggart, Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers, *18 Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, Cambridge, MA, July 2017

J. Hartline, D. Hoy, S. Taggart, Price of Anarchy for Auction Revenue, *15th Annual ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC)*, Palo Alto, CA, July 2014

C. Cusack, T. Lewis, D. Simpson, S. Taggart, The Complexity of Pebbling in Diameter Two Graphs, *SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics*, Volume 26, Issue 3, 2012

R. Buehler, Z. Goldman, D. Liben-Nowell, Y. Pei, J. Quadri, A. Sharp, S Taggart, T. Wexler, K. Woods, The Price of Civil Society, *Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE)*, Singapore, December 2011

Funding

NSF Award 2218814
Title: Collaborative Research: AF: Small: RUI: Data Science from Economic Foundations
Duration: 10/1/2022 - 9/30/2025
Award Amount: $239,830

Awards

Oberlin College Research Status
- Internal Grant Award for 2023-2024

W.M. Keck Family Foundation Faculty Fellowship in Natural Sciences and Mathematics
- Oberlin College, 2020-2021

Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Best TA Award
- Recognized for work on EECS 336: Design and Analysis of Algorithms, 2016

Honorable Mention, NSF Graduate Research Fellowship
- Project Title: "Algorithmic Pricing of Combinatorial Commons" 2012

Cabell Graduate Fellowship
- Northwestern University, 2012

Invited Talks, Workshops, and Tutorials

Simple Delegated Choice
Refereed Lightning Talk, EC 2022 Workshop on Algorithmic Contract Theory, Boulder, Colorado, July 2022

[1] Undergraduate coauthor.

Simple Delegated Choice
Invited Talk, STOC 2022 Workshop on Algorithmic Contract Theory, Rome, Italy, June 2022

Responsible Algorithms for Real People
Invited Lightning Talk, Workshop on Algorithmic Learning and Economics 2022 Workshop on Algorithmic Contract Theory, Naxos, Greece, June 2022

Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria
Refereed Talk, Games2020 - 6th World Congress of the Game Theory Society, July 2021

Mechanism Design for Social Good: Inequality
Invited Lightning Talk, Part of tutorial at Data Science Africa, Kampala, Uganda, July 2020

Mechanism Design for Social Good: Targeting and Provision for Vulnerable Populations
With Sera Linardi. Tutorial at EC 2020, Remote, July 2020

Optimal Algorithms for Strategic Inputs
Invited Talk, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA, January 2020

Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms
Invited Talk, INFORMS 2019, Seattle, WA, October 2019

Near-Optimal Non-Revelation Mechanisms
Invited Talk, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, July 2016

Non-Revelation Mechanism Design
Refereed Talk, 2nd Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory and Data Science, Maastricht, Netherlands, June 2016

The Universality of IID Position Auctions
Invited Talk, 22nd International Symposium on Mathematical Programming, Pittsburgh, PA, July 2015

Mechanism Design for Program Committees
Invited Talk, Harvard University, May 2015

The Approximate Optimality of Simple Auctions
Invited Talk, Midwest Theory Day, Purdue University, May 2014

First-Price Auctions: An Archetype for Analysis
Invited Talk, Bellairs Workshop on Algorithmic Game Theory, Bellairs, Barbados, April 2014

Service

Editor in Chief, *SIGecom Exchanges*

Track Chair
- Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO) (2021, 2022, 2024)

- Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good (MD4SG) (2020)

Senior Program Committee
- ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) (2024, 2025)

Program Committees
- AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) (2020 - 2026)
- Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (2019, 2020, 2023 - 2025)
- ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) (2018 - 2023, 2026)
- Workshop on Mechanism Design for Social Good (2017 - 2019)
- ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (2022)
- The Web Conference (TheWebConf) (2023 - 2026)
- AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society (AIES) (2023, 2024, 2025)
- Equity and Access in Algorithms, Mechanisms, and Optimization (EAAMO) (2024, 2025)

Reviewing
- IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS) (2020)
- International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT) (2019)
- ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (2019, 2020)
- ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA) (2017, 2018, 2020, 2023)
- European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA) (2017)
- ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC) (2017)
- International World Wide Web Conference (WWW) (2017)
- Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE) (2021)
- AAMAS Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop (GAIW) (2022, 2025)
- Optimization Letters
- Games and Economic Behavior
- ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
- Management Science
- Operations Research
- SIAM Journal on Computing
- Operations Research Letters
- Journal of the ACM
- International Game Theory Review

Doctoral Committees
- Meryem Essaidi, Princeton University, 2022.

Other
- Organizer, Inequality Working Group, Mechanism Design for Social Good Research Group (2019-2022)
- Member-at-large, American Association of University Professors, Oberlin Chapter (2019-2020)
- Organizer, Unit on Civic Participation, Reading Group on Mechanism Design for Social Good (2017, 2018)